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I. INTRODUCTION
“When the well’s dry, we know the worth of water.”1 Nodding to
water’s—specifically groundwater’s—value to inhabitants of the arid
American West, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in early 2017 held
the Agua Caliente Band of Cahuilla Indians had impliedly reserved a
federal right to groundwater underlying their land.2 The court rea-
© Copyright held by the NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW. If you would like to submit a re-
sponse to this Article in the Nebraska Law Review Bulletin, contact our Online
Editor at lawrev@unl.edu.
* Hannes D. Zetzsche, J.D. Candidate, 2020, University of Nebraska College of
Law; B.A., 2016, University of Portland. The author thanks Professors Anthony
Schutz and John Snowden for their dynamic presentation of curricula in water
and Native American law, respectively; Ramsey E. Kropf for introducing him to
the Agua Caliente case; and the NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW staff for readying this
piece for publication.
1. Agua Caliente Band of Cahuilla Indians v. Coachella Valley Water Dist. (Agua
Caliente), 849 F.3d 1262, 1265 (9th Cir. 2017), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 468 (2017),
and cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 469 (2017) (quoting BENJAMIN FRANKLIN, POOR RICH-
ARD’S ALMANAC (1746)).
2. Id. at 1271–72.
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soned its decision with the well-established Winters doctrine, under
which the Supreme Court has recognized for more than a century that
when the federal government agreed to reserve land from public
purchase, it impliedly reserved enough surface water to accomplish
the reservation’s purpose.3 Agua Caliente rippled through western
water law communities, however, because it marked the first federal
circuit court decision to recognize a federal reserved right to
groundwater.4
Soon after the 2017 Agua Caliente decision, appellants in the case
joined attorneys generals from seventeen western states to petition
the Supreme Court for review.5 The Court denied certiorari in Novem-
ber 20176 and, for now, the Agua Caliente decision joins the Winters
doctrine as binding law in nine states and two U.S. territories.7 It re-
mains possible, if not likely, however, that the Court will grant certio-
rari to review Agua Caliente in the future because the case was
trifurcated at the district court level, meaning stages two and three
3. Id. at 1268 (citing Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564, 575–78 (1908); Cap-
paert v. United States, 426 U.S. 128, 138 (1976)).
4. See Zeslie Zablan, Tribal Rights to Groundwater: The Case of Agua Caliente, 48
ENVTL. L. 617 (2018) (describing the decision as “historic” and “groundbreaking”).
For articles generally agreeing with the holding of the Ninth Circuit’s decision,
see Richard Griffin & Claudia Antonacci, Agua Caliente and the Argument for
Aboriginal Rights to Groundwater, 19 U. DENV. WATER L. REV. 316 (2016); Wom-
ble et al., Indigenous Communities, Groundwater Opportunities, SCI. MAG.,
453–55, Aug. 2018; Steve Dubb, Agua Caliente Indians Victory Could Alter Water
Practices in Western States, NONPROFIT Q. (Dec. 6, 2017), https://nonprofitquarter
ly.org/2017/12/06/agua-caliente-indians-victory-alter-water-practices-western-
states/ [https://perma.unl.edu/7XWL-92EN]; see also Judith V. Royster, Indian
Tribal Rights to Groundwater, 15 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 489 (2006); DAVID H.
GETCHES ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON FED. INDIAN L. 828 (7th ed. 2017) (stat-
ing “[the reserved rights doctrine] is one of the most vital Indian sovereignty is-
sues today, and gives rise to questions about how the modern era Supreme Court
cases concerning jurisdiction over non-Indians should be applied.”). For views
critical of Agua Caliente and its holding, see Micheline Fairbank & Debbie Leo-
nard, State Groundwater Management and Federal Reserved Rights: What’s
Next?, ABA WATER RES. COMM. NEWSL., Mar. 2018; Ian James, Supreme Court
Won’t Hear CaliforniaWater Agencies’ Appeal in Tribe’s Groundwater Case, THE
DESERT SUN (Nov. 27, 2017), https://www.desertsun.com/story/news/environment
/2017/11/27/supreme-court-wont-hear-water-agencies-appeal-tribes-groundwater
-case/897469001/ [https://perma.unl.edu/8SX8-DDXA] (quoting the director of a
California water management board for the proposition that Agua Caliente “could
completely change water management in our area.”).
5. Brief of the States of Nevada, Arizona, Arkansas, Idaho, Nebraska, North Da-
kota, South Dakota, Texas, Wisconsin, and Wyoming as Amicus Curiae in Sup-
port of Petitioners, Coachella Valley Water District v. Agua Caliente Band of
Cahuilla Indians, 2017 WL 3485656 (U.S.) (Nos. 17-40, 17-42).
6. Coachella Valley Water Dist. v. Agua Caliente Band of Cahuilla Indians, 138 S.
Ct. 468 (Nov. 27, 2017); Desert Water Agency v. Agua Caliente Band of Cahuilla
Indians, 138 S. Ct. 469 (2017).
7. Fairbank & Leonard, supra note 4, at 7.
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are yet to be completely litigated.8 The Supreme Court may choose to
review Agua Caliente on appeals from the second or third stages of
litigation.
This Comment argues that the Ninth Circuit rightly decided Agua
Caliente because the Winters principles that support a reserved right
to surface water also support a reserved right to groundwater. Al-
though the court reached the appropriate conclusion, it did so by an
always-never approach to Winters groundwater that is out of step with
Supreme Court doctrine.
Instead of the Agua Caliente approach, this Comment proposes a
three-prong Winters Groundwater Test for analyzing claims of federal
reserved groundwater. Part II traces the Winters doctrine through its
hundred-plus years development. Part III discusses why the court
rightly decided Agua Caliente but poorly analyzed it. Part IV proposes
the Winters Groundwater Test, as informed by Supreme Court prece-
dent. Finally, Part V provides an overview of how courts and the Su-
preme Court should view the Winters Groundwater Doctrine that is
quickly emerging.
II. THE WINTERS DOCTRINE
A. Winters v. United States
Federal reserved water rights have been ruled by the Winters doc-
trine since 1908.9 The doctrine’s namesake case arose from a dispute
over instream flow rights to the Milk River in Montana.10 In 1888,
Congress had reserved the Fort Belknap Reservation’s land “as an In-
dian reservation as and for a permanent home and abiding place for
the Gros Ventre and Assiniboing bands or tribes of Indians.”11 But by
1900, defendants in the case had also claimed land along the Milk
River, settling upstream from the Reservation and building large
dams and irrigation systems to divert a significant volume of the
River’s water.12 The Gros Ventre and Assiniboing Tribes filed suit,
claiming defendants violated their right to the Milk River’s uninter-
rupted flow,13 which they needed to fulfill the Reservation’s purpose—
8. Agua Caliente, 849 F.3d at 1267.
9. Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564 (1908). For a discussion of the federal
government’s power to create federal law-based property rights in groundwater
via the United States Constitution’s Commerce Clause, see John D. Leshy, The
Federal Role in Managing the Nation’s Groundwater, 14 HASTINGS W. NW. J.
ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 1323, 1324 (2008).
10. Winters, 207 U.S. at 564.
11. Id. at 565–68.
12. Id. at 567.
13. Id.
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to irrigate 30,000 acres of cropland and ensure the “home and abiding
place” they reserved by their 1888 agreement with Congress.14
The Supreme Court of the United States decided the case by inter-
preting Congress’s 1888 agreement with the tribes.15 Noting the Gros
Ventre and Assiniboing Tribes inhabited the land and used its appur-
tenant surface water long before the land’s reservation was formally
recognized by Congress,16 the Court applied a common canon of inter-
pretation that resolves all treaty ambiguities in favor of Native Ameri-
cans.17 Nothing in the agreement with Congress mentioned water,18
but at the time the land was formally reserved, it was the American
government’s policy to break up Native Americans’ tribal lives and re-
place them with agricultural lifestyles.19 In arid Montana, the Fort
Belknap Reservation would have been “practically valueless” for agri-
culture if water had not been reserved in tandem with the Reserva-
tion’s land.20 Was it reasonable to believe the tribes gave up their
rights to “command of the lands and the waters,” which were readily
available21 and made the Reservation adequate for its purpose?22 The
Court held it was not.23 Thus, Winters established a rule of law that,
unless the text of a reservation treaty expressly disavowed any reser-
vation of water rights, the treaty implicitly reserved for its land suffi-
cient water to fulfill the reservation’s purpose.24
B. Development of the Winters Doctrine
After Winters, the Supreme Court did not decide another federal
reserved water rights case for more than fifty years. Then, in Arizona
v. California,25 the Court clarified how to quantify Winters water
14. Id. at 565.
15. Id. at 575.
16. Id. at 566–67.
17. Id. at 576–77; accord Choctaw Nation v. Oklahoma, 397 U.S. 620, 631 (1970);
Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515, 551–54 (1832); Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian
Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 208 n.17 (1978).
18. Winters, 207 U.S. at 576.
19. Id. (“It was the policy of the Government, it was the desire of the Indians, to
change [uncivilized] habits and to become a pastoral and civilized people.”).
20. Id.
21. Id. (noting ample water flowed appurtenant to the Fort Belknap Reservation, not
only in the Milk River, adjacent to the reservation, but also 2,900 inches of water
in streams and springs flowing along the land’s surface).
22. Id. (“If it were possible to believe affirmative answers, we might also believe that
the Indians were awed by the power of the government or deceived by its
negotiators.”).
23. Id. at 576–77.
24. Id. For a broader discussion of the Winters rule, see Todd A. Fisher, The Winters
of Our Discontent: Federal Reserved Water Rights in the Western States, 69 COR-
NELL L. REV. 1077 (1984).
25. Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546 (1963).
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rights.26 When the United States, as trustee for Native Americans in
Arizona, California, and Nevada, asserted water rights to the Colo-
rado River’s instream flow, a special master of stream adjudication
allocated to the tribes a reserved right sufficient to irrigate as much of
their reservations’ land as was practicably irrigable.27 Because the
reservations’ purposes were to provide land for agriculture, the special
master reasoned the reservation had implicitly reserved enough water
as would practicably be needed to irrigate its acres of agriculture.28
Arizona challenged the special master’s quantification method, how-
ever, arguing the tribes’ water rights should be limited to the “reason-
ably foreseeable needs” of their reservations.29 The Court rejected
Arizona’s proposed measuring standard because a quantification of
water based on how many people lived on the reservation today and
into the future could “only be guessed.”30 Instead, the special master’s
method was “the only feasible and fair way” to quantify federal re-
served water rights.31
Six years after Arizona, the Court found a reserved water right
within the Death Valley National Monument in Nevada.32 The Cap-
paerts owned a seven million dollar ranch adjacent to the Monument
and pumped groundwater from beneath it.33 The United States sued
to enjoin the Cappaerts from pumping groundwater because the
pumping had caused the water level in one of the Monument’s limes-
tone caverns to drop, thereby threatening an endangered species of
pupfish.34 In establishing the Monument by statute, the federal gov-
ernment claimed Congress had implicitly reserved enough appurte-
nant surface and groundwater to support the Monument’s purpose,
which included protection of the pupfish.35
Looking to the Monument’s purpose, the Court found that
pupfish’s protection was included in the reservation’s purpose, which
was stated in Congress’s operative statute as preserving “unusual fea-
tures of scenic, scientific, and educational interest.”36 The pupfish
lived in an underground pool of scientific feature; so despite no ex-
press mention of the pupfish in the Monument’s operative statute, the
26. Id. at 600–01.
27. Id. For further discussion on the practicably irrigable acreage standard, see Jen-
nele Morris O’Hair, The Federal Reserved Rights Doctrine and Practicably Irriga-
ble Acreage: Past, Present, and Future, 10 BYU J. PUB. L. 263 (1996).
28. Arizona, 373 U.S. at 601.
29. Id. at 596.
30. Id. at 601.
31. Id.
32. Cappaert v. United States, 426 U.S. 128 (1976).
33. Id. at 133.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 133–35.
36. Id. at 141.
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federal government had impliedly reserved for the pupfish enough
water to ensure its survival.37
Effectively, the Court enjoined the Cappaerts from pumping any
groundwater that would diminish the Monument’s protected under-
ground pool below a level that could sustain the pupfish. However, the
Court’s opinion included language that significantly limited the scope
of federal reserved water rights. It declared the federal government
“can protect its water from subsequent diversion, whether the diver-
sion is of surface or groundwater,”38 but the non-reservation diverter
need only provide enough water to satisfy the “minimal need” of the
reservation’s purpose.39
After Cappaert, the Court next considered federal reserved water
rights when New Mexico challenged a federal claim of instream flow
rights from the Rio Mimbres River for the benefit of the Gila National
Forest.40 Congress reserved the National Forest via an Organic Ad-
ministration Act,41 but the Act only expressed the reservation’s pur-
pose as “to improve and protect the forest within the boundaries, or for
the purpose of securing favorable conditions of water flows . . . .”42 The
Court determined the Act’s express and specific purpose limited the
National Forest’s impliedly reserved water rights significantly, estab-
lishing the preservation of instream flows for “aesthetic, environmen-
tal, recreational and fish purposes”43 was not a “primary purpose” of
the reservation.44
By engaging a primary purpose analysis, the Court intended to
strictly construe the scope of federal reserved water rights implied
under the Winters doctrine.45 The Court noted Congress generally has
37. Id.
38. Id. at 143.
39. Id. at 141.
40. United States v. New Mexico, 438 U.S. 696 (1978).
41. Forest Service Organic Act of 1897, 16 U.S.C. § 475 (2018).
42. New Mexico, 438 U.S. at 706.
43. Id. at 704.
44. Id. at 711–12. Note that at least two state courts have found New Mexico applica-
ble to Native American reservations. See State ex rel. Greely v. Confederated Sa-
lish and Kootenai Tribes of the Flathead Reservation, 712 P.2d 754, 766–67
(Mont. 1985); In re Adjudication of All Rights to Use Water in the Gila River
System (Gila IV), 35 P.3d 68, 74 (Ariz. 2001) (en banc) (arguing the primary pur-
pose test only applies to non-Indian federal reservations with rights quantified
only to meet their original purposes). However, because the majority of courts
and scholars have incorporated New Mexico in their analyses of Native American
reservations’ water rights, this Comment will do so as well.
45. New Mexico, 438 U.S. at 702 (“Where water is necessary to fulfill the very pur-
poses for which a federal reservation was created, it is reasonable to conclude,
even in the face of Congress’ express deference to state water law in other areas,
that the United States intended to reserve the necessary water. Where water is
only valuable for a secondary use of the reservation, however, there arises the
contrary inference that Congress intended, consistent with its other views, that
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shown a deference to states’ regulation of water law, including most
federal projects.46 In thirty-seven statutes, Congress has even ex-
pressly recognized its intent for states to administer their own sys-
tems of water law for water within their borders.47 It would constitute
judicial overreach, the Court argued, to imply all rights in water to the
federal government absent clear evidence of Congressional intent.48
Justice Lewis Powell concurred, arguing the “implied-reservation doc-
trine should be applied with sensitivity to its impact upon those who
have obtained water rights under state law and to Congress’ general
policy of deference to state water law.”49
In 1989, Justice Powell’s sensitivity doctrine nearly became the
rule for a majority opinion.50 In reviewing a Wyoming decision, Jus-
tice Sandra Day O’Connor authored a majority opinion that would
have considered a “sensitivity” analysis during the quantification pro-
cess.51 Under her analysis, a reservation land’s impliedly reserved
right to water would be diminished by the amount that the reserva-
tion’s future purposes would be of marginal economic value compared
to the state’s ability to put it to use.52 Each gallon of federal reserved
Winters water would have been subject to an inquiry: is it reasonably
likely that future projects will require this water for productive
uses?53 But the sensitivity doctrine in its strictest form remained un-
published when Justice O’Connor recused herself from the case, and
the United States would acquire water in the same manner as any other public or
private appropriator.”).
46. Id. at 701 (“Where Congress has expressly addressed the question of whether
federal entities must abide by state water law, it has almost invariably deferred
to the state law.”).
47. Id. at 701 n.5.
48. Id. at 701. But see id. at 718–25 (Powell, J., dissenting) (agreeing with the major-
ity’s sensitivity to state interests, but arguing the majority has too narrowly iden-
tified the Organic Administration Act’s primary purpose and stating, “I therefore
would hold that the United States is entitled to so much water as is necessary to
sustain the wildlife of the forests, as well as the plants.”).
49. Id. at 707 (Powell, J., dissenting).
50. Andrew C. Mergen & Sylvia F. Liu, A Misplaced Sensitivity: The Draft Opinions
in Wyoming v. United States, 68 U. COLO. L. REV. 683 (1997).
51. Id. at 702.
52. Wyoming v. United States, Opinion, 2d Draft at 18, No 88-309 (U.S. 1989) (recir-
culated June 12, 1989) (O’Connor, J.) (unpublished document) (on file with the
Library of Congress, Manuscript Division), reprinted in Mergen & Liu, supra note
50, at 741–60.
53. Wyoming v. United States, Dissenting Opinion, 2d Draft at 10, No 88-309 (U.S.
1989) (recirculated June 23, 1989) (Brennan, J.) (unpublished document) (on file
with the Library of Congress, Manuscript Division), reprinted in Mergen & Liu,
supra note 50, at 741–60 (“The Court thus cuts loose the quantification of Indian
water rights from their moorings in congressional or Executive intent and makes
them subject to an equitable weighing of needs . . . Today’s decision . . . strikes at
the heart of the Winters right itself.”).
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the Court instead affirmed the Wyoming Supreme Court’s decision by
an equally divided decision.54
III. THE WINTERS DOCTRINE APPLIED TO GROUNDWATER
A. Growing Trend of Recognizing Federal Reserved
Groundwater Rights
Although the United States Supreme Court has never directly con-
fronted the question, the growing trend among state and federal
courts is to recognize a federal reserved right to groundwater in some
cases.55 In 1988, the Wyoming Supreme Court adjudicated a case of
water rights along the Big Horn River System, in which Native Ameri-
cans on the Wind River Indian Reservation claimed federal reserved
groundwater rights so they could irrigate agricultural crops planted in
the reserved land.56 The court agreed with the tribe’s claims, conclud-
ing “[t]he logic which supports a reservation of surface water to fulfill
the purpose of the reservation also supports reservation of ground-
water.”57 However, because it could find no precedential authority for
recognizing a reserved groundwater right,58 the Wyoming Supreme
Court elected not to recognize one.59
The Montana and Arizona Supreme Courts each expressly dis-
agreed with Big Horn’s judgement and recognized a reserved right to
groundwater.60 When reservation lands in arid regions lack other
54. In re General Adjudication of All Rights to Use Water in the Big Horn River Sys-
tem (Big Horn), 753 P.2d 76 (Wyo. 1988), aff’d mem., 492 U.S. 406 (1989).
55. See id.; In re Gen. Adjudication of All Rights to Use Water in the Gila River Sys.
& Source (Gila III), 989 P.2d 739 (Ariz. 1999) (en banc), cert. denied sub nom.,
Phelps Dodge v. United States, 530 U.S. 1250 (2000); Gila IV, 35 P.3d 68 (2001)
(en banc); Confederated Salish and Kootenai Tribes of the Flathead Reservation
v. Stults, 59 P.3d 1093, 1099 (Mont. 2002); Tweedy v. Tex. Co., 286 F. Supp. 383,
385 (D. Mont. 1968); United States v. Wash. Dep’t of Ecology, 375 F. Supp. 2d
1050, 1058 (W.D. Wash. 2005); see also Gila River Pima-Maricopa Indian Cmty.
v. United States, 695 F.2d 559, 561 (Fed. Cir. 1982) (rejecting tribal rights to
water in the Salt River because “Gila River water and groundwater constituted
the intended sources for irrigation of the Gila River Reservation”). Note the Mc-
Carran Amendment of 1952 authorized joinder of the federal government in law-
suits to adjudicate tribal reserved rights to water in a stream system. See 43
U.S.C.A. § 666 (2007).
56. Big Horn, 753 P.2d at 96.
57. Id. at 99.
58. Id. at 99–100. Note that the Ninth Circuit, in United States v. Cappaert, 508 F.2d
313, 317 (9th Cir. 1974), found a reserved right to groundwater, but the Supreme
Court expunged the decision when it narrowly affirmed Cappaert v. United
States, 426 U.S. 128, 142 (1976).
59. Big Horn, 753 P.2d at 99 (“[N]ot a single case applying the reserved water doc-
trine is cited to us.”). At least one scholar has described the court’s analysis as
“decidedly weird.” See Leshy, supra note 9, at 1325.
60. Gila III, 989 P.2d at 746; Gila IV, 35 P.3d at 78; Confederated Salish, 59 P.3d at
1099.
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methods for obtaining water, the Arizona Supreme Court acknowl-
edged they cannot survive without the rights to pump groundwater.61
Treaties historically reserved these lands to provide the Native Ameri-
cans there with “homelands,”62 which were “necessary for tribes to
achieve the twin goals of Indian self-determination and economic self-
sufficiency.”63 Thus, so long as other waters were not adequate, the
tribe must have reserved for itself groundwater to accomplish the res-
ervation’s primary purpose.64
Scholars have generally also agreed that the Winters doctrine rec-
ognizes a federal reserved right to groundwater in some cases. In his
seminal Handbook of Federal Indian Law, Felix Cohen argued there
was no reason not to include appurtenant groundwater within the
Winters doctrine, just as surface water was included.65 Another
scholar noted that by now, “little, if any doubt remains that Indian
tribes have groundwater, as well as surface water rights.”66 Thus, the
still-growing majority view among courts and scholars is that the Win-
ters doctrine applies to surface water and groundwater alike.
B. Agua Caliente
Although numerous courts and scholars argued in some cases to
recognize federal reserved rights to groundwater, the Ninth Circuit’s
2017 Agua Caliente decision marked the first decision by a federal cir-
cuit court to formally recognize such a right.67 The Agua Caliente
Band of Cahuilla Indians (Agua Caliente Band) had lived for centuries
61. Gila III, 989 P.2d at 746; see also Tweedy v. Tex. Co., 286 F. Supp. 383, 385 (D.
Mont. 1968) (“The land [on the Blackfeet Indian Reservation] was arid—water
would make it more useful, and whether the waters were found on the surface of
the land or under it would make no difference.”).
62. Gila IV, 35 P.3d at 76. At least one court in addition to the Arizona Supreme
Court has adopted the homeland purpose approach to quantification. See Colville
Confederated Tribes v. Walton, 647 F.2d 42, 47–48 (9th Cir. 1981) (holding “one
purpose for creating this reservation was to provide a homeland for the Indians to
maintain their agrarian society”). Barbara A. Cosens and Jessica Lowrey each
argue compellingly for why more courts should follow Gila IV and adopt the
homeland standard for quantification. See Barbara A. Cosens, The Measure of
Indian Water Rights: The Arizona Homeland Standard, Gila River Adjudication,
42 NAT. RES. J. 835 (2002); Jessica Lowrey, Home Sweet Home: How the Purpose
of the Reservation Affects More than Just the Quantity of Indian Water Rights, 23
COLO. J. INT’L ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 201 (2012).
63. Gila IV, 35 P.3d at 76.
64. Gila III, 989 P.2d at 96; accord Confederated Salish, 59 F.3d at 1099.
65. See FELIX COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW § 19.03(2)(a), at 119 (1942).
66. A. DAN TARLOCK, LAW OF WATER RIGHTS AND RESOURCES § 9.41, at 9.80–80.1 (5th
ed. 2002); see also Leshy, supra note 9, at 1325 (noting Congress itself has acted
on an assumption that Native Americans have a reserved right to groundwater
by approving settlements of water rights that provide for groundwater and sur-
face water use).
67. Agua Caliente, 849 F.3d at 1262.
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in what is now California’s Coachella Valley.68 Recognizing this long-
standing relationship to the land, Presidents Grant and Hayes in 1876
and 1877 ordered 31,396 acres of land formally reserved for the Agua
Caliente Band to be “withdrawn from sale and set apart”69 for “Indian
purposes.”70 The two executive orders sought to encourage Native
Americans to “build comfortable houses, improve their acres, and sur-
round themselves with home comforts.”71 The United States sought to
formally reserve for the Agua Caliente Band “permanent homes, with
land and water enough.”72
Water had always been essential for the Agua Caliente Band to
sustain their homes in California’s arid Coachella Valley.73 With
three inches of average rainfall and an over appropriated Whitewater
River System, the Coachella Valley provided the Agua Caliente Band
and other appropriators insufficient surface water.74 The only signifi-
cant source of water near the Agua Caliente Band was the Coachella
Valley Groundwater Basin (Basin),75 and in recent years the Band
had purchased groundwater from two state water agencies that pri-
marily manage the Basin: the Coachella Valley Water District and the
Desert Water Agency (collectively, State Water Agencies).76 But be-
cause the agencies also sold Basin groundwater to support nine cities,
four hundred thousand people, and sixty-six thousand acres of farm-
land,77 the Basin experienced significant overdraft since the 1980s.78
In May 2013, the Agua Caliente Band sued the State Water Agen-
cies, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief.79 They claimed a fed-
eral reserved right to pump groundwater directly from the Basin,80
alleging it was necessary to fulfill the reservation land’s purpose.81
The United States District Court for the Central District of California
split the litigation into phases to determine three issues: (1) whether
68. Id. at 1265.
69. Exec. Order of May 15, 1876, in 1 Charles J. Kappler, Indian Affairs: Laws and
Treaties 821 (1904).
70. Exec. Order of Sept. 29, 1877, in Kappler, supra note 69, at 822.
71. Agua Caliente, 849 F.3d at 1265 (quoting 1875 COMM’R INDIAN AFF., ANN. REP.
224).
72. Id. (quoting 1877 COMM’R OF INDIAN AFF., ANN. REP. 37).
73. Id. at 1266.
74. Id. at 1266–67.
75. Id. at 1266.
76. Id.
77. Id. (noting that overdraft pumping from the Coachella Valley Groundwater Basin
has resulted in an average “recharge deficit of 239,000 acre-feet, with cumulative
overdraft estimated at 5.5 million acre-feet as of 2010”).
78. Id. In response to this concern, the California Water Project sought to augment
the groundwater pumping by recharging the Basin with water from the Colorado
River. See id.
79. Id. at 1266–67.
80. Id. at 1267.
81. Id. at 1270.
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the Agua Caliente Band was owed a federal reserved right to the
groundwater appurtenant to its reservation land; (2) whether the
Band was entitled to a minimum quality of water; and (3) whether the
Band had the right to store water for future use in the pore space
beneath its reservation land.82 In March 2015, the district court
granted the Agua Caliente Band’s motion for summary judgment in
the first stage, concluding as a matter of law that the Band was enti-
tled to a federal reserved right to the groundwater underlying its re-
served land.83 The district court then certified an interlocutory appeal
to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.84
The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s grant of summary
judgment,85 agreeing the Agua Caliente Band had impliedly reserved
a federal right to groundwater underlying its reserved land.86 The
court’s decision followed two steps. First, it analyzed whether the or-
ders forming the reservation implicitly contemplated any reservation
of surface water under the Winters doctrine.87 Second, it considered
whether the Winters doctrine should also apply to groundwater.88
The court answered both inquiries in the affirmative. First, it
would have defeated the reservation’s underlying purpose of establish-
ing a home and supporting an agrarian society for the court to not find
water implicitly reserved with the land.89 Second, there was no reason
not to extend the Winters doctrine to groundwater, as “[t]he Winters
doctrine does not distinguish between surface water and groundwater.
Rather, its limits derive only from the government’s intent in with-
drawing land for a public purpose and the location of the water in rela-
tion to the reservation created.”90
C. Agua Caliente’s Always-Never Approach
Although the Ninth Circuit rightly decided to recognize the Agua
Caliente Band’s federal reserved right to groundwater in this case, it
did so by an overly simplistic always-never approach that is inconsis-
82. Id. at 1267 (reviewing the procedure of Agua Caliente Band of Cahuilla Indians v.
Coachella Valley Water Dist., No. EDCV 13-883-JGB, 2015 WL 1600065, at *2
(C.D. Cal. Mar. 20, 2015)).
83. Agua Caliente Band, 2015 WL 1600065, at *10.
84. Agua Caliente, 849 F.3d at 1267.
85. Id. at 1273.
86. Id. at 1272.
87. Id. at 1268–70 (“[W]e must first decide whether the United States, in establishing
the Agua Caliente Reservation, impliedly reserved water.”).
88. Id. at 1270–73 (“While we conclude that the federal government envisioned water
use when it established the Tribe’s reservation, that does not end our inquiry. We
must now determine whether the Winters doctrine, and the Tribe’s reserved
water right, extends to the groundwater underlying the reservation.”).
89. Id. at 1270.
90. Id. at 1272.
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tent with the Supreme Court’s Winters doctrine. The court found that
because there was no practical reason to distinguish between surface
water and groundwater in their use on reservations, once a claimant
like the Agua Caliente Band could establish that its reservation of
land implied some use of water, it would always be entitled to ground-
water.91 Effectively, per Agua Caliente’s always-never approach, a
reservation entitled to water is also always entitled to groundwater,
and a reservation not entitled to any water is never entitled to any
groundwater.92
The Ninth Circuit’s always-never approach is inconsistent with
Winters doctrine precedent, however, because the Supreme Court has
applied three limitations to claims of Winters water that could provide
instances where an appropriator is entitled to surface water but not
groundwater.93 First, to successfully claim Winters water, a party
must show that the primary purpose for which the land was reserved
could require the provision of that water source.94 For example, if a
reservation land required water to provide a habitat in which fish
could grow, that purpose could only require and make use of surface
water but not groundwater. The second prong of a successful Winters
water claim requires the party to show land conditions that make the
provision of a water source actually necessary.95 But if available sur-
face water met the reservation purpose’s needs, the party would have
no viable claim to groundwater. Third, any claimant of federal re-
served groundwater rights must show that the state system would not
otherwise provide adequate water.96 A claimant would not receive
groundwater in a system where the state’s law would provide ade-
quate surface water.
As the foregoing examples demonstrate, each of the three Winters
principles stretch the Ninth Circuit’s always-never approach.97 Under
each principle, there are examples of reservations that could qualify
for surface water, but not groundwater. This nuanced approach re-
flects the Supreme Court decisions encapsulated in the three prongs of
the Winters Groundwater Test. The following section details the bur-
dens for each prong of the Winters Groundwater Test and provides
examples of claimants’ characteristics that would meet and fail each
burden.
91. Id. at 1268–73.
92. Id.
93. See Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564 (1908).
94. Id. at 565.
95. Cappaert v. United States, 426 U.S. 128, 135 (1976).
96. United States v. New Mexico, 438 U.S. 696, 715 (1978).
97. See Agua Caliente, 849 F.3d at 1267.
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IV. PROPOSING THE WINTERS GROUNDWATER TEST
A. Primary Purpose Prong
Like other theories of contract interpretation,98 the Winters doc-
trine seeks to effectuate the parties’ intent at the time they agreed to
reserve the land.99 To do this, the first prong of the Winters Ground-
water Test conducts a textual analysis of the reservation’s forming
documents to ascertain the parties’ intents. At the time the parties
formally created the reservation, did they intend a primary purpose
that could have required the use of groundwater?
This threshold inquiry originates from New Mexico, where the
Court held that unless the parties’ “primary purpose” in forming the
reservation could have required the right to appropriate surface
water, no Winters right would be implied.100 Because the Organic Ad-
ministration Act, by its terms and historical context, had reserved the
Gila National Forest only for a primary purpose of protecting for-
ests,101 the federal government could not claim an instream flow right
in the Rio Mimbres River for secondary purposes.102 Unless the par-
ties intended a primary purpose for the reservation for which a source
of water could be required, that water would not be retroactively im-
plied.103 Instream flow rights were not impliedly reserved because
they could not be reasonably required for logging.104
The parties who formed the Agua Caliente Reservation could have
necessitated groundwater for its primary purpose because agriculture
could necessitate groundwater.105 In executive orders, Presidents
Hayes and Grant acknowledged a reservation of land to the Agua Ca-
liente Band to be used “for the permanent use and occupancy of the
Mission Indians.”106 During the 1870s, the federal government was
focused on securing for Native Americans land from which they could
transform tribal lifestyles to lives as “civilized” farmers.107 This could
98. See, e.g., 11 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 31:4 (4th ed.) (“Except in cases of ambigu-
ity, or when no written memorial or memorandum is made of the contract and
none is required by a law in the nature of a Statute of Frauds, the object in inter-
preting or construing a written contract is to ascertain the meaning and intent of
the parties as expressed in and determined by the words they used . . . .”).
99. Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564, 575 (1908).
100. New Mexico, 438 U.S. at 711–12.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 704.
103. Id. at 715.
104. Id.
105. Agua Caliente Band of Cahuilla Indians v. Coachella Valley Water Dist., 849
F.3d 1262, 1269 (9th Cir. 2017).
106. Exec. Order of May 15, 1876, supra note 69, at 821; Exec. Order of Sept. 29, 1877,
supra note 70, at 822.
107. See S. LYMAN TYLER, A HISTORY OF INDIAN POLICY 71–88 (1973); see also Agua
Caliente, 849 F.3d at 1267 (quoting 1875 COMM’R INDIAN AFF., ANN. REP. 224 for
the proposition that the federal government sought to incentivize the Band to
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only be accomplished if the Agua Caliente Band had “permanent
homes, with land and water enough” to grow row crops.108 Therefore,
the Agua Caliente Reservation was formed for the primary purpose of
creating a land on which the Agua Caliente Band could produce profit-
able row crops,109 a use that could necessitate groundwater.110
Not all reservations’ primary purposes could necessitate ground-
water, however. The federal government in New Mexico would have
been rebuffed if it would have retroactively claimed a reserved right to
pump groundwater because there, it was not reasonably necessary
that the harvesting or growth of timber could necessitate a supply of
groundwater—any connection would have been too attenuated.111
Similarly, the relationship between groundwater and other primary
purposes would also be insufficiently direct, as seen in preservation of
a fish habitat,112 general environmental conservation,113 and most
recreation.114 Because these reservation purposes could never have
reasonably necessitated groundwater at the time the reservation was
formally created, the parties could not have intended groundwater to
then be impliedly reserved, and Winters will not retroactively supple-
ment their intents.
B. Actual Need Prong
The second prong of the Winters Groundwater Test also seeks to
evince the parties’ intent at the time they formally created the reser-
vation. A canon of treaty interpretation requires that treaties between
the federal government and Native Americans be interpreted liberally
in favor of the Native Americans, particularly when there are ambigu-
“build comfortable houses, improve their acres, and surround themselves with
home comforts.”).
108. Agua Caliente, 849 F.3d at 1265–66 (quoting 1877 COMM’R INDIAN AFF., ANN.
REP. 37).
109. Id.
110. ANTHONY D. TARLOCK & JASON A. ROBISON, LAW OF WATER RIGHTS AND RE-
SOURCES § 2:10 (2018) (noting the frequent use of groundwater withdrawals for
irrigation in American agriculture).
111. See United States v. New Mexico, 438 U.S. 696, 715 (1978).
112. See, e.g., United States v. Adair, 723 F.2d 1394 (9th Cir. 1983); Colville Confeder-
ated Tribes v. Walton, 647 F.2d 42, 47–48 (9th Cir. 1981); see also Katheryn A.
Bilodeau, The Elusive Implied Water Right for Fish: Do Off-Reservation Instream
Water Rights Exist to Support Indian Treaty Fishing Rights?, 48 IDAHO L. REV.
515 (2012) (discussing treaty rights to fish).
113. See, e.g., United States v. Gila Valley Irrigation Dist., 920 F. Supp. 1444, 1448 (D.
Ariz. 1996), aff’d, 117 F.3d 425 (9th Cir. 1997). But see Amy Choyce Allison, Ex-
tending Winters to Water Quality: Allowing Groundwater for Hatcheries, 77
WASH. L. REV. 1193 (2002) (arguing for a Winters doctrine that recognizes re-
served right to water of sufficient quality when the reservation’s purpose was to
procure a fishery).
114. See, e.g., New Mexico, 438 U.S. at 704.
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ities in the document’s text.115 The Winters doctrine builds on this
theory by ruling it would be unreasonable to believe the Native Ameri-
cans and federal government both intended to reserve land that would
be “practically valueless” for Native Americans’ use without irriga-
tion.116 In most cases, the Native Americans had occupied the land for
centuries, so it would be unreasonable to believe they intended to re-
serve land that would be valueless to them.117 Therefore, to ascertain
Native Americans’ intent in agreeing to formally reserve land, courts
can look to the land’s conditions over time, inquiring whether the con-
ditions have historically been such that the Native Americans must
have impliedly intended to reserve groundwater sufficient to accom-
plish the reservation’s purpose.118
In applying this actual need analysis to claims of reserved surface
water, the Supreme Court has examined the land’s conditions, paying
particular attention to whether water is appurtenant to the land and
necessary given the reservation land’s climatic conditions.119 For ex-
ample, the Court in Winters premised its decision on a recognition
that in many arid parts of the West, a group’s survival and fulfillment
115. Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564, 576 (1908) (“By a rule of interpretation of
agreements and treaties with the Indians, ambiguities occurring will be resolved
from the standpoint of the Indians.”); see also United States v. Winans, 198 U.S.
371, 380–81 (1905) (“[W]e will construe a treaty with the Indians as that unlet-
tered people understood it, and as justice and reason demand in all cases where
power is exerted by the strong over those to whom they owe care and protection,
and counterpoise the inequality by the superior justice which looks only to the
substance of the right, without regard to technical rules.”) (internal quotation
marks and citations omitted).
116. Winters, 207 U.S. at 576.
117. Id. For the proposition that a treaty with Native Americans represents a reserva-
tion by the Tribe of all rights not expressly ceded to the federal government, not
merely a grant of rights from the federal government to the Native Americans,
see Winans, 198 U.S. 371; accord Washington v. Fishing Vessel Ass’n, 443 U.S.
658, 678, 680–81 (1979). Because the 1888 agreement with Congress represented
the tribes’ reservation of land that was already theirs, the Winters Court noted it
was even less plausible the tribes would have ceded the water necessary to sus-
tain their land. Winters, 207 U.S. at 577.
118. See, e.g., Winters, 207 U.S. at 577; Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546, 550–51
(1963); Cappaert v. United States, 426 U.S. 128, 135 (1976); New Mexico, 438
U.S. at 699. Note, however, that a tribe’s non-use does not destroy its vested right
to reserved water. See Arizona, 373 U.S. at 546. Rather, the historical use stan-
dard goes to the parties’ intent when they formed the reservation, asking
whether they intended to reserve groundwater as a potential source to fulfill the
reservation’s purpose. Id.
119. See Gila III, 989 P.2d 739, 746 (Ariz. 1999) (en banc) (“The reservations consid-
ered in [Winters and Arizona] depended for their water on perennial streams. But
some reservations lack perennial streams and depend for present and future sur-
vival substantially or entirely upon pumping of underground water. We find it no
more thinkable in the latter circumstance than in the former that the United
States reserved land for habitation without reserving the water necessary to sus-
tain life.”).
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of its reservation’s purpose depended on its access to water.120 In sub-
sequent decisions, the Court has invariably begun its analysis by ana-
lyzing the geographic conditions of the reserved land, inquiring
whether water ran through or along the reservation land and whether
it would be necessary to fulfill the reservation’s purpose.121 After all,
it would only have been reasonable for the parties to reserve land if
they also reserved sufficient water on the land to meet the “minimal
needs”122 of the land occupants’ “present and future needs.”123
Because the Coachella Valley Groundwater Basin directly under-
lies the Agua Caliente Reservation in California’s arid Coachella Val-
ley, the Agua Caliente Band must have intended to reserve
groundwater to produce agriculture there.124 Like surface water that
is deemed appurtenant to land because it flows across or proximately
alongside it,125 water flows to the Coachella Valley Groundwater Ba-
sin across—or even through—the Agua Caliente Band’s reserved
land.126 And in the Coachella Valley, where annual precipitation is no
more than three to six inches,127 an agriculture-based land reserva-
tion must have intended to reserve the water within its boundaries.
Therefore, the Agua Caliente Reservation also meets the second prong
of the Winters Groundwater Test.
In contrast to the Agua Caliente Band, claimants to Winters
groundwater will be unable to meet the second prong if their reserved
land is generally in a wet climate and not overlying any appurtenant
aquifers. For example, the southern Oregon coast is home to the Con-
federated Tribes of Coos, Lower Umpqua, and Siuslaw Indians.128 But
the groups could almost never show the need necessary to justify re-
served rights to groundwater because they receive roughly sixty in-
ches of precipitation annually.129 Similarly, in places like much of the
120. Winters, 207 U.S. at 577.
121. Arizona, 373 U.S. at 550–51; Cappaert, 426 U.S. at 135; New Mexico, 438 U.S. at
699.
122. Cappaert, 426 U.S. at 139.
123. Arizona, 373 U.S. at 600–01.
124. Agua Caliente Band of Cahuilla Indians v. Coachella Valley Water Dist., 849
F.3d 1262, 1271 (9th Cir. 2017).
125. Appurtenant, Black’s Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014) (defining appurtenant as
“annexed to a more important thing”).
126. See Agua Caliente, 849 F.3d at 1266–67.
127. Id. at 1266.
128. Overview of the Nine Tribes, OR. DEP’T HUM. SERV., https://www.oregon.gov/DHS/
ABOUTDHS/TRIBES/Pages/Tribes.aspx [https://perma.unl.edu/XCU6-3CE6]
(last visited Mar. 12, 2019).
129. Climate of Oregon, W. REG’L CLIMATE CTR., https://wrcc.dri.edu/narratives/ORE
GON.htm [https://perma.unl.edu/Z29R-78ZN] (last visited Mar. 31, 2019); see
also, e.g., North Bend FAA Airport, Oregon (356073): Period of Record Monthly
Climate Summary, W. REG’L CLIMATE CTR., https://wrcc.dri.edu/cgi-bin/cliMAIN.
pl?ornort [https://perma.unl.edu/WC9Q-KGXP] (last visited Mar. 31, 2019); Re-
gional Temp. and Precipitation Table, NAT’L WEATHER SERV. FORECAST OFFICE,
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northern Idaho panhandle and western Montana, where there are few
reliable aquifers,130 groups could not show they actually need ground-
water that is appurtenant to their reservation. By failing to show this,
it is less likely they reasonably intended to reserve groundwater for
their reservation’s purpose.
C. Sensitivity Prong
While the Winters Groundwater test’s first and second prongs ex-
amine the reservation’s forming documents and land conditions to as-
certain the intended primary purpose for the reserved land, the third
prong provides an analysis based on considerations of surrounding le-
gal systems. If the legal structures that govern the surrounding state’s
administration of groundwater would provide an adequate supply of
groundwater to accomplish the reservation’s intended primary pur-
pose, then there is no reason for the court to formally require a federal
administration of federal reserved groundwater rights.
Throughout the Winters doctrine’s development, the Court has
maintained that any claim to federal reserved water should be consid-
ered with sensitivity to the role of states as primary administrators of
water resources within their borders.131 Winters acknowledged a “con-
flict of implications” in finding Congress had implicitly taken away
from Montana the role of administering water rights to the Rio Mim-
bres River when Congress many times before had expressly reserved
for states the right to administer their water.132 In New Mexico, the
Court further raised the bar for preempting states’ presumed adminis-
tration of water, citing Congress’s broad deference to state water law
in thirty-seven statutes and states’ reliance interests in autonomous
administration of their own systems.133 And before Justice O’Connor’s
recusal and opinion in the Court’s most recent Winters matter, a ma-
jority stood ready to institute a strict analysis of sensitivity to states’
roles as water regulators.134 The Arizona Supreme Court thus sum-
U.S. NAT’L OCEANIC & ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN. (Dec. 1, 2018), https://w2.weather.
gov/climate/ [https://perma.unl.edu/8RJE-WUQ7].
130. Womble et al., supra note 4, at 454.
131. See, e.g., Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564, 576–77 (1908); United States v.
New Mexico, 438 U.S. 696, 715 (1978); see also id. at 718–25 (Powell, J., dissent-
ing) (stating he “would hold that the United States is entitled to so much water as
is necessary to sustain the wildlife of the forests, as well as the plants.”).
132. See Winters, 207 U.S. at 576–77. The Court expressed sympathy for the state’s
water law, citing the investments made by defendants in reliance on a state ap-
propriation right. Id. at 569.
133. New Mexico, 438 U.S. at 701 n.5 (quoting a statute that expresses Congress’ pol-
icy to “recognize and protect the rights and interests of the State of Texas in
determining the development of the watersheds of the rivers . . . and its interests
and rights in water utilization and control.”).
134. Wyoming v. United States, Opinion, 2d Draft at 18, No 88-309 (U.S. 1989) (recir-
culated June 12, 1989) (O’Connor, J.) (unpublished document) (on file with the
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marized the sensitivity prong when it held a federal right to ground-
water would only be recognized if it could be shown that the
underlying state system would not provide “adequate” water to accom-
plish the reservation’s primary purpose.135
The Agua Caliente Band’s claim demonstrated the facts necessary
to meet the sensitivity prong.136 California historically operated a cor-
relative rights regime of groundwater appropriation, meaning land
ownership alone created the right to pump groundwater from any aq-
uifer underlying a person’s land and put it to beneficial use.137 Each of
the overlying landowners to an aquifer were required to share the re-
source equitably as tenants in common.138 In times of scarcity, each
user would be limited to a proportionate share of the aquifer’s safe
yield.139 This system allowed the Agua Caliente Band’s neighbors an
equal right under state law to pump from the Coachella Valley
Groundwater Basin.140 And as the water table lowered because of the
demand brought by four hundred thousand users and sixty-six thou-
sand acres of irrigated farmland,141 the Agua Caliente Band was lim-
ited from pumping the groundwater to which it was entitled under
federal law.142 Because the state’s provision of water was inade-
quate,143 the Agua Caliente Band was entitled to claim a federal re-
served right to groundwater, which displaced state law.
Other state systems of water law administration could avoid pre-
emption, however. Scholars have noted that one system of water law
that could neatly complement and provide for Winters water rights is
prior appropriation.144 The system of prior appropriation sets the su-
Library of Congress, Manuscript Division), reprinted in Mergen & Liu, supra note
50, at 741–60.
135. Gila III, 989 P.2d at 746.
136. See Agua Caliente Band of Cahuilla Indians v. Coachella Valley Water Dist., 849
F.3d 1262, 1267 (9th Cir. 2017).
137. Katz v. Walkinshaw, 141 Cal. 116 (Cal. 1903); see generally Joseph W. Del-
lapenna, A Primer on Groundwater Law, 49 IDAHO L. REV. 265, 280 (2013) (“[W]e
find outside of California, at most, only limited recognition of correlative rights in
the sense of proportional sharing.”).
138. Katz, 141 Cal. at 116.
139. Id. at 126–27.
140. Agua Caliente, 849 F.3d at 1272; see also Judith V. Royster, Winters in the East:
Tribal Reserved Rights to Water in Riparian States, 25 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L &
POL’Y REV. 169, 187 (2000) (stating that under the doctrine of correlative rights,
an “owner has a right to use not a specific quantity of water, but that amount of
water that is reasonable under the circumstances, taking account of the correla-
tive reasonable use rights of all other [owners] on the water course.”).
141. Agua Caliente, 849 F.3d at 1266.
142. Id. at 1271.
143. Id.
144. See, e.g., Richard B. Collins, The Future Course of the Winters Doctrine, 56 U.
COLO. L. REV. 481 (1985); Judith V. Royster, Conjunctive Management of Reserva-
tion Water Resources: Legal Issues Facing Indian Tribes, 47 IDAHO L. REV. 255
(2011).
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periority of each appropriator’s water right by the date they used the
water for a beneficial use.145 Because groups like the Agua Caliente
Band have appropriated water for beneficial use since at least 1876—
and likely for centuries before then, subject to historical records146—
their priority would be superior to nearly every other state right.147
Some courts have already incorporated Winters surface water rights
in state prior appropriation systems, setting the priority dates as the
time the reservation was formally recognized or, in some cases, as
time immemorial.148 Thus, when the state system provides adequate
water to meet the reservation’s purpose, as shown in prongs one and
two, prong three would not be met under the Winters Groundwater
Test.
Despite objections that the Winters Groundwater Test’s third
prong would harm Native American interests by subjecting them to
state law,149 the sensitivity prong would in fact achieve positive policy
objectives for Native American interests, incentivizing states to ac-
commodate their unchanged Winters claims150 and providing uniform
environmental stewardship of a common, sensitive resource. First, the
sensitivity prong does nothing to limit Native Americans’ right to ap-
propriate enough water to meet their land’s primary purpose,151 so it
should provide them with significant bargaining power over states.
Scholars have noted that in many cases, settlements are more likely to
achieve positive outcomes for Native Americans than litigious adjudi-
cations,152 and this prong will only encourage states to provide the
145. See generally WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS § 18.03 (Robert E. Beck & Amy K. Kel-
ley eds., 3d ed. 2009); Gregory J. Hobbs, Jr., Protecting Prior Appropriation Water
Rights Through Integrating Tributary Groundwater: Colorado’s Experience, 47
IDAHO L. REV. 5 (2010); Veronica A. Sperling & David M. Brown, Outline of Colo-
rado Groundwater Law, 1 U. DENV. WATER L. REV. 275, 286–94 (1998). A major-
ity of western U.S. states today employ some form of prior appropriation system
of groundwater law. See Royster, supra note 144, at 258.
146. Exec. Order of May 15, 1876, supra note 69, at 821; Exec. Order of Sept. 29, 1877,
supra note 70, at 822
147. CYNTHIA BROUGHER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL32198, INDIAN RESERVED WATER
RIGHTS UNDER THE WINTERS DOCTRINE: AN OVERVIEW 2 (2011); accord Cohen,
supra note 65, at 119.
148. United States v. Adair, 723 F.2d 1394, 1415 (9th Cir. 1983).
149. See Agua Caliente Band of Cahuilla Indians v. Coachella Valley Water Dist., 849
F.3d 1272, 1267 (9th Cir. 2017); see also Royster, supra note 144, at 268 (“In
extreme cases, state uses may entirely dewater an aquifer beneath reservation
lands.”).
150. Note the sensitivity prong in this test does not affect the amount of water owed to
reservations. Rather, it merely affects who administers the water. Agua Caliente,
849 F.3d at 1267.
151. Id.
152. BONNIE G. COLBY ET AL., NEGOTIATING TRIBAL WATER RIGHTS: FULFILLING
PROMISES IN THE ARID WEST 80 (2005); Michael R. Moore, Native American Water
Rights: Efficiency and Fairness, 29 NAT. RES. J. 3 (1989); Debbie Shosteck, Be-
yond Reserved Rights: Tribal Control over Groundwater Resources in a Cold Win-
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means for Native Americans within their boundaries to access their
entitlement to adequate water. If the state’s offer is inadequate, then
the courts will find the sensitivity prong met.
Because groundwater is a finite resource limited by climate and
demand, Native Americans and states also have significant incentives
to work together to steward the water on which they depend.153 In the
Coachella Valley, both state and Native American appropriators will
lose out when the federal government steps in to administer the Agua
Caliente Band’s groundwater rights because this will prevent Califor-
nia from continuing its robust water planning efforts. With the federal
and state governments separately regulating the Coachella Valley
Groundwater Basin, state water agencies cannot successfully imple-
ment uniform stewardship and planning.154 When the state can pro-
vide adequate water to meet federal reserved groundwater rights,
both state and Native American interests win.155
V. CONCLUSION
Agua Caliente reached the right judgment.156 As a growing trend
of courts and a majority of scholars have recognized in recent years, it
makes sense to apply the Winters doctrine to claims of federal re-
served groundwater in some cases.157 Therefore, although the Ninth
Circuit was first among federal circuit courts to recognize a Winters
groundwater right,158 courts throughout the country should look to
Agua Caliente’s sound conclusion.
But in applying the Winters doctrine to claims of groundwater
rights, courts should reject the Ninth Circuit’s inventive always-never
approach and instead adopt the Winters Groundwater Test, as de-
tailed in this Comment. The test is manageably simple, providing for
only three prongs of objective inquiries; the emphasis is on parties’
reasonable, not subjective, intents,159 and claimants can only meet the
sensitivity prong if state water provisions are actually, rather than
speculatively, inadequate.160 Courts therefore have an objective model
which they can systematically follow. Additionally, the Supreme
Court is likely to follow this model because it is based entirely on prin-
ters Climate, 28 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 325 (2003); Womble et al., supra note 4, at
455.
153. Womble et al., supra note 4, at 454.
154. Agua Caliente, 849 F.3d at 1266; see also O’Hair, supra note 27, at 273 (discuss-
ing the competition between non-federal water users and federal Indian and non-
Indian water users for a finite supply of federal reserved water).
155. COLBY ET AL., supra note 152, at 80.
156. Agua Caliente, 849 F.3d at 1262.
157. See infra Part III.A.
158. Agua Caliente, 849 F.3d at 1262.
159. See infra Parts IV.A and III.B.
160. See infra Part IV.C.
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ciples the Court has enunciated for over one hundred years since Win-
ters. If the Court decides to review Agua Caliente or another
groundwater case in the near future, it need not reinvent the wheel to
apply Winters to groundwater. Rather, it can look to the three prongs
it has implicitly enumerated, encapsulated in the Winters Ground-
water Test.
